P ublic inquiries into health system failures continue to feature prominently in New Zealand. Recent major public reports have highlighted under-reporting of abnormalities in the nationwide cervical cancer screening programme, 1 substandard care at a public hospital 2 and mishandling of investigations into adverse medical events. 3 A pilot study of Auckland hospitals showed that 10% of admissions were associated with adverse events. 4 Together, these reports paint a gloomy picture of the quality of health care and the effectiveness of complaints mechanisms. Complaints about medical practitioners are at a record high and con dence in the ability of the New Zealand health and legal systems to respond to concerns about practitioners and systems found wanting is at an all-time low. The situation has been described as a 'medical emergency'. 5 New Zealand has a regulatory system that is rehabilitative, rather than punitive; one that seeks to protect patients yet support doctors. It includes a number of features consistent with modern approaches to reducing error and improving safety. Why is this system perceived to be failing both patients and doctors? Are we doomed to a cycle of public inquiries driven by political responses to media campaigns that fuel (and feed on) the 'public's hue and cry' 6 for medical accountability?
Thirteen years ago, the watershed 1988 Report of the Cervical Cancer Inquiry 7 shook the New Zealand medical establishment to its roots and signalled a fundamental shift in public attitudes. Demands for patient autonomy challenged the traditional approach of bene cence and paternalism and led to reforms of the medical disciplinary process. An independent Health and Disability Commissioner was created in 1994 to develop and enforce a Code of Consumers' Rights designed to 'promote and protect the rights of health consumers' and 'facilitate the fair, simple, speedy, and ef cient resolution of complaints'. 8 Although the Code 9 provides no right to access health care, it regulates the quality of care. Services must be provided with reasonable skill and care, in compliance with legal, professional, ethical and other relevant standards, by providers who cooperate to ensure quality and continuity of care. Any person may complain to the Commissioner, or local advocacy services, alleging a breach of a consumer's rights. The focus of investigations and reports is on resolution of complaints at the lowest appropriate level, rehabilitation (usually by selfor peer review) of practitioners whose care is found de cient, and public education. Non-identifying reports are published on the Commissioner's website. 10 There has been a dramatic decline in the number of medical practitioners facing disciplinary charges. 11 The Health Commissioner legislation was followed by a new Medical Practitioners Act 1995, intended to 'protect the health and safety of members of the public' by providing mechanisms to 'ensure that medical practitioners are competent to practise medicine'. Provisions for legally protected quality assurance activities, competence reviews and recerti cation programmes, and for supervision of medical practitioners, re ect an enlightened attempt to move away from a simplistic model of medical discipline that seeks to cull bad apples. As noted in a recent judgment, this rehabilitative focus 'is in the interests of the public primarily for reasons of safety but also because of the extensive investment New Zealand has in the education of medical practitioners and the need to provide a proper quality service for all New Zealanders'. 6 These regulatory initiatives had been preceded 20 years earlier by novel accident compensation legislation that covered medical misadventure. Since 1974, persons injured by medical error -the failure by a registered health professional to observe the standard of care and skill reasonably to be expected in the circumstanceshave been entitled to state-funded rehabilitation and (if employees) earnings-related compensation. Medical malpractice claims are effectively prohibited by a statutory bar on claims for damages arising directly or indirectly from personal injury covered by the Act. The Court of Appeal in Green v Matheson (litigation following the Cervical Cancer Inquiry) rmly shut the door on claims for compensatory damages for personal injury arising from the way in which a patient had been dealt with by the health system. 12 Claims for exemplary or punitive damages are available, but the Court has recently con rmed that even gross medical negligence will not lead to such an award in the absence of conscious wrongdoing. 13 The net result is that health professionals are the bene ciaries of a system that looks to the state to compensate victims of medical negligence. Doctors pay modest professional indemnity levies and are not required to contribute to the cost of state funding for the medical misadventure account. The collection of medical misadventure premiums from registered health professionals is provided for in the Accident Insurance Act 1998 but has not occurred in practice. In the absence of de nitive studies, one can only speculate whether the lack of any tort deterrent has had an adverse impact on the quality of health care in New Zealand. Brennan notes that 'we lack empirical information on how tort litigation has affected quality improvement generally'. 14 What is becoming clear is that no-fault compensation for patients (even the New Zealand variant that covers
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negligence), when combined with a medical complaints system that seeks rehabilitation rather than redress, is missing the mark. On the one hand, local doctors believe they are practising in the most hostile environment in the Western world, in a country obsessed with safety. Yet injured patients face a complaints process that is 'confusing, cumbersome, dif cult to access and costly, both nancially and emotionally'. 3 The public sees a medical profession that is shielded from damages claims for negligence, reluctant to blow the whistle on errant colleagues and slow to discipline substandard doctors, and a public health system that underfunds public hospitals and screening programmes and fails to monitor and evaluate the quality of care delivered. Worse, where the system does produce relevant data, there is often no follow-up.
A simplistic solution would be a return to the right of injured patients to sue and a harsher medical disciplinary system. This would be shortsighted. Medical malpractice litigation would inevitably prove a forensic lottery for patients, drive up medical insurance premiums and lead to defensive medical practices. Nor is there any evidence that public oggings of delinquent doctors would deter others or lead to improved health care.
New Zealand already has sound regulatory levers. They should be made to work, notably by ensuring that relevant information is shared between central agencies handling medical complaints. External complaint mechanisms need to be accessible, exible (to avoid duplication of inquiries) and appropriate (reserving the Commissioner's jurisdiction for allegations that warrant further investigation).
The public, too, has a role to play. It may be time to reconsider whether changes in societal expectations and the ease of making a complaint (by phone) are fuelling a culture of complaint. The right to make a complaint -the quintessential 1990s' right af rmed in the Code -needs to be exercised with some sense of responsibility.
Finally, external controls must be underpinned by 'a functioning internal morality'. 15 The medical profession should be leading the calls for adequate state-funded compensation for medical misadventure victims, reporting the ways in which quality assurance activities are improving health care, proving that remedial mechanisms are not simply window-dressing, and, in appropriate cases, accepting responsibility for its role in individual and systems failures. It is time for the moral voice of medicine to be heard.
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